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1 Introduction 
Piracy is a current and vast problem. And for the shipping industry and the global community, 
combating this issue has proven to be a costly concern. Between the years 2010 and 2019, pirate 
attacks or attempted pirate attacks have occurred between 162 and 445 times annually.1 This 
statistic does not, unfortunately, distinguish between attacks that occur on the high seas from 
those that occur in the territorial sea. The latter one is normally called armed robbery and does 
not constitute piracy under international law.  
The most current data concerning armed robbery and piracy in Asia shows that such attacks 
have doubled during January- June 2020 compared to the same period in 2019.2 And yet, the 
real numbers of attacks towards vessels are likely much higher than those found in the statistics. 
This is because reporting attacks entail increased insurance policy and loss of time, and 
therefore a lot of vessels and crews abstain from filing such reports. The number of unreported 
attacks has been estimated to cover as much as 50 % of all attacks.3  
Furthermore, piracy acts can threaten the environment if the vessel attacked carries dangerous 
chemicals or radioactive material.4 These acts also endanger life and health of the crews, as 
well as the pirates, and has also resulted in reluctance of vessels to carry aid to poor countries, 
such as Somalia.5 Sometimes crews are taken in detention by the pirates, and on average 
hostages are being kept for five months, and some as long as almost three years.6 The hostages 
are often treated poorly, and some are killed.7  Only in 2011 as many as 35 suffered this faith.  
 
With all these factors taken into consideration, Rothwell and Stephens have characterised the 
challenges regarding piracy as the biggest challenge to international shipping in peace time 
 
1 https://www.statista.com/statistics/266292/number-of-pirate-attacks-worldwide-since-2006/, extracted 15th July 
2020.  
2 ReCAAP ISC Half Year Report 2020, p. 2, found at https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/half-
year/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Half%20Yearly%20Report%202020.pdf, extracted September 14th 2020 
3 Frostad, M., 2016, Voldelige hav, Pirateri og jus, Oslo, Cappelen Damm akademisk, p. 16 referring to several 
authors including Birnie, P., 1987, Piracy: Past, present and future, 11, Marine Policy, 163, p. 173 
4 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00470616/document, p. 22, table 1, extracted 15th July 2020 
5 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Rapporteur: Mr. Holovaty, S., 2010, Report, Doc.12194, The 
Necessity to take additional international legal steps to deal with sea piracy, B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr 
Holovaty, rapporteur, 1.2 Aim of this Report, point 10 
6 https://eunavfor.eu/mission/ extracted the 14th of August 2020 
7 Frostad, M., 2016, Voldelige hav, Pirateri og jus, Oslo, Cappelen Damm akademisk, p. 19 
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since the Suez channel was closed in 1956.8 Because of uncertainties on several levels, the 
global costs of piracy are hard to estimate. However, when adding the price of naval forces, 
ransoms, prosecution, re-routing of vessels as well as other primary and also secondary costs, 
the numbers calculated by the Oceans Beyond Piracy in 2010, estimated the costs to lie between 
seven and 12 billion dollars every year.9 Other sources have estimated the numbers to be as 
high as 18 billion dollars annually.10 These numbers must be used with some caution as they 
are not totally up to date. Though updated statistics are hard to find, it appears clear that the 
topic of piracy is vastly relevant for many actors to this day. 
 
Though piracy is a current issue, its roots are old. The act might even be the third oldest 
occupation in history, only surpassed by prostitution and medicine.11 In fact, the issue of piracy 
has long been regarded as "an outdated ‘eighteenth-century concept’ of chiefly historical 
interest".12 The problem was perceived as so old and obsolete, that during the drafting of the 
1958 Convention on the High Seas (hereafter HSC), some delegations suggested to delete the 
provisions regarding piracy, stating that it “no longer constituted a general problem”.13 
Regardless, it was an inescapable fact that these acts, however often they occurred, could 
threaten the global economy. Also, their attacks had occasionally been so brutal and violent that 
the actors were regarded as hostes humani generis, that is enemies of the whole human race.14  
 
While the issue of piracy was regarded as outdated, yet sufficiently serious that suggestions to 
omit provisions regarding piracy were not followed through, the rules regarding piracy in the 
HSC was not subject to thorough discussions and reflections.15 These rules were later borrowed 
by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea16 (LOSC).   
 
 
8 Rothwell D. R. and Stephens, T., 2016, The International Law of the Sea, 2nd edition, Hart publishing, p. 173 
9 https://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/Piracy-Docs/the-economic-cost-of-piracy.pdf?sfvrsn=0, 
extracted 14th August 2020 
10 Frostad, M., 2016, Voldelige hav, Pirateri og jus, Oslo, Cappelen Damm akademisk p. 21 
11 Birnie, P., 1987, Piracy: Past, present and future. Marine Policy, 11(3), 163-183 p. 163  
12 Petrig, A., 2015, “Piracy”, in Rothwell, D., et al. (eds), in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Oxford 
University Press, p. 843 
13 Ibid 
14 Birnie, P., 1987, Piracy: Past, present and future. Marine Policy, 11(3), 163-183 p. 164  
15 Frostad, M., 2016, Voldelige hav, Pirateri og jus, Oslo: Cappelen Damm akademisk, p. 63 
16 Petrig, A., 2015, “Piracy”, in Rothwell, D., et al. (eds), in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Oxford 
University Press, p. 843 
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The LOSC, widely considered the constitution of the seas,17 defines piracy in Art. 101. The 
provision states that:  
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed:  
         (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board     
             such ship or aircraft;  
        (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State;  
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b).”  
 
According to (a) (i), the most used part of the definition, there are five cumulative criterions 
that must be met in order for an act to be defined as piracy. First, there has to be an illegal act 
of violence or detention or any act of depredation. Second, the act must be committed for 
“private ends”. Third, the actors must be the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft. 
Forth, it must be directed at the high seas. Fifth and last, it must be directed against another ship 
or aircraft, or against persons or property onboard such ship or aircraft. Because of the 
ambiguous nature or vagueness of the text, the interpretation of several of the criterions may be 
subject to discussion.18  
 
Specifically, the criterion “for private ends” has been subject to great debate. What does it 
mean? If interpreted widely it may encompass all acts that are not authorized by a state 
including insurgent and terrorist attacks, environmental activism, etc., thus enabling these 
motives to constitute piracy. But if interpreted narrowly, it may only cover acts that are for 
 
17 First mentioned by Koh, T. B., 1982, «A Constitution for the Oceans» remarks by the President of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 6-11 December 1982, title of the remarks 
 
18 Assumed by Petrig, A., 2015, “Piracy”, in Rothwell, D., et al. (eds), in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the 
Sea, Oxford University Press, p. 846; Frostad, M., 2016, Voldelige hav: Pirateri og jus, Oslo: Cappelen Damm 
akademisk, p. 65, Birnie, P., 1987, Piracy: Past, present and future. Marine Policy, 11(3), 163-183 p. 171 etc.  
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personal benefit, like financial gain or revenge. One of the situations of greatest interests in 
recent years are acts of violence directed at vessels sailing on the outer side of the territorial sea 
of Somalia, as some of these attacks allegedly have been conducted to protect Somalian seas 
from illegal fishing and dumping of toxic wastes.19 A narrow interpretation would exclude such 
acts from constituting piracy, but a wide interpretation could encompass such acts. It is also 
possible that the right interpretation lies somewhere between these two counterpoints. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a common understanding in the international community that, 
at the very least, actions authorized by a state disqualifies the act from being piracy and rather 
places the responsibility on the state authorizing the violent actions.20    
 
The importance of the definition of piracy is linked to the fact that piracy is the only 
transnational crime, meaning criminal acts that span national borders,21 that is also subject to 
truly universal jurisdiction.22 This means that closely related crimes that do not fit the definition 
of piracy, will not be subject to the wide enforcement or adjudicational jurisdiction that piracy 
is governed by. However, disagreement between states on how to interpret the provision leads 
to the undesirable result of divergent or potentially incorrect interpretation of the international 
definition.23   
 
Though there are other criteria subject to debate, this thesis will only focus on the criterion “for 
private ends”, as it would not be feasible to comprehensively cover additional criteria in depth 
within the time and page limit set for this task. This entails that the rest of the criteria, as well 
as other provisions in LOSC and other sources of law, will be covered only when they 
contribute to the interpretation of “private ends”.   
 
 
19 Lennox, P., 2008, Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 
Prepared for the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, p.8, found at 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/96/attachments/original/1413689031/Contemporary_Piracy_
off_the_Horn_of_Africa.pdf?1413689031, extracted 2nd September 2020; also suggested by United Nations 
Security Council, S/2017/859, Para 16-17 and 30; United Nations Security Council, S/2019/867 para 24-25  
20 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1955, Volume I, Summary records of the seventh session, 2 
May – 8 July 1955, p. 44, para 80 
21 Natarajan, M., 2019, Part IA: Varieties of Transnational Crimes. in Nataranja, M., (ed), International and 
Transnational Crime and Justice (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3, p. 3  
22 Churchill, R., 2014, "The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—Fit for Purpose?.", 
in Koutrakos, P. and Skordas, A., (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International 
Perspectives, Hart Publishing, 9–32, p. 10  
23 Ibid, p. 23. 
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In order to answer the question in this study, the thesis will be structured as follows: The 
upcoming chapter will be a presentation and reasoning for the use of methodology in this thesis. 
To avoid an overly theoretical touch, a thorough explanation of the chosen method will not be 
conducted in this chapter, but comments on methodology will be made continuously throughout 
the text.  
 
The third chapter seeks to interpret the criterion “for private ends” in the LOSC Art 101. This 
is the main objective of the thesis and was chosen because the provision is regarded as 
international customary law and is therefore globally applicable.24 For these reasons, the article 
does provide a natural starting point and other legal sources will be used as tools to interpret 
the relevant part of the article. The criterion will be interpreted in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation given by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter the VCLT)25 
and with the help of other relevant legal sources as listed in the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ Statute)26 Art. 38.  
 
Lastly, a brief conclusion will be drawn in the fourth chapter based on the findings in the 
previous chapters.   
 
2 Methodology 
2.1 General methodology 
International law can be analysed through different lenses. Some authors use the New Haven 
Approach. This approach does not clearly distinguish between values and legal norms but is 
valuable when analysing decision making and to formulate policy proposals.27 Other authors 
interpret law with an international relation theory, placing the assumption that effectiveness is  
the main, if not the only criterion when interpreting and applying law.28 Another methodology 
is strict positivism. These are just a few of the many methods used by jurists. The purpose of 
 
24 Petrig, A., 2015, “Piracy”, in Rothwell, D., et al. (eds), in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Oxford 
University Press, p. 843  
25 1969 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS  331 
26 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 33 UNTS 993 
27 Simma, B. and Paulus, A. L., 1999, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflicts: A Positivist View, in Ratner, S., & Slaughter, A., (eds), Appraising the Methods of International Law: 
A Prospectus for Readers. The American Journal of International Law, 93(2), 302-316, p. 305 
28 Ibid, p. 304 
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mentioning them is simply to show that different methods focuses on different elements of law 
or society. As the focus of these methods can be diverging, the choice of method might 
determine the result of an analysis. Consequently, it is important to be aware when choosing 
method.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine de lege lata. For this purpose, the method of revised 
positivism would seem most suited. Revised positivism is commented on by Simma and Paulus, 
whom describe it as the strict interpretation of the law in force.29 This method delimits against 
the use of formal but nonlegal sources such as natural reason, moral principles and political 
ideologies.30 Yet, the method acknowledges that the law is not independent of its context, as an 
extreme positivism might suggest.31 Revised positivism also recognises the rules of 
interpretation in VCLT Art. 31, other relevant sources listen in the ICJ Statute, as well as the 
general shift of international norms. With the shift of international norms, focus has moved 
towards a larger use of the interpretive tools of law, rather than a sole focus on the strict will of 
the states as written in a treaty.32  
 
2.2 Specific approach 
Because LOSC is written and agreed to in six different and equally authentic languages, there 
might be a variety in the interpretation of the criterion in the different authentic languages. As 
English is the only authentical language of the LOSC that this author is intimate with, most 
attention will be given to this interpretation.  
Yet after discussing the topic with a student of Spanish linguistics, I became aware of the 
possible nuances in the Spanish text, compared to the English version. Curious to find out more, 
I used my contacts and seeking help to interpret the different authentic versions. Thankfully, I 
got the help I wanted from these credible bi- and multilinguals; Kristine Moan, a student of 
Spanish linguistics, Mohamed el Mouden, Professor in Arabic linguistic at the Universidad de 
Cádiz, Spain, Jan Solski, postdoc at the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea and Rolf 




31 Ibid, p. 306 
32 Ibid 
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Ambassador of Norway to France. The interpretations of the ordinary meanings of the non-
English texts are heavily anchored in their contributions. 
When entrusting the interpretation of the different languages to other people, I admittedly lose 
some control over the result. However, the people contributing are highly qualified individuals 
interpreting the ordinary meaning of a text in a language they are intimate with. As always 
when the information is second hand, there is a possibility of misunderstanding. These 
translations will therefore not be given determining weight by themselves, but will be viewed 
as a whole, in accordance with the VCLT Art. 33. Unfortunately, I have only managed to get 
help in interpreting five out of the six authentical languages, and the Chinese text is therefore 
lacking from this study. Though this version might have contained valuable information 
regarding its interpretation, the five other versions that have been studied represents a variety 
of language branches: Germanic, Roman, Slavic and Semitic. Because the languages studied 
stems from a variety of different language families and branches, there is reason to believe that 
the joint interpretation is both nuanced and representative.  
A comment is also due in regard to the ICJ Statute. Art. 38 (1) makes a non-exhaustive list of 
authoritative legal sources to be used in international law.33 This list includes judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists as subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rule of law. To attain better flow in this paper, and because these sources 
are merely subsidiary means of interpretation, the views expressed through them will be used 
throughout the thesis as comments and contributions to the interpretation of the criterion instead 
of being sorted out in a separate chapter.  
While the Harvard Draft Convention and Annexes (Harvard Draft) mentioned that there exists 
“a few international cases, chiefly concerning the status of insurgents vessels or of irregular 
privateers”,34 I have only been able to access one case of relevance for the interpretation of the 
criterion “for private ends”. And even this case, The Lotus Case,35 only dealt with the issue of 
piracy indirectly.  
 
33 Pellet, A., 2012, Part Three Statute of the International Court of Justice, Ch.II Competence of the Court, 
Article 38, in The statute of the international court of justice: A commentary by A. Zimmermann, Oxford 
University Press, p. 700 
34 Harvard Draft Convention and Annexes, 1932, Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, 26, 
739-886, p. 764 
35 SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk), 1927, P.C.I.J. (ser A) No 10 
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Luckily there are several national cases and other state practices that contribute, both in number 
and in depth, to the interpretation. Because both sources display the intention of the parties 
through various practices, the sources will be studied and compared together and in the same 
subchapter. 
Finally, a short comment is due on delimitation. Because of the page limit for this task, I have 
chosen to largely delimitate against the legal sources of customary international law and general 
principles of law. The process of identifying customary international law is a lengthy one, and 
some of the sources used for this exercise can and will be used in a more precise and shorter 
way when identifying practices of states. In regard to the source of general principles of law, 
the International Court of Justice (hereafter the ICJ), have shown extreme parsimony in its use. 
In fact, after studying the source, Pellet has found general principles of law to be mentioned 
expressly only four times in the entire case law of the ICJ since 1922.36 And every time it was 
ruled out. Still, the content of general principles is used shortly to interpret the treaty.  
 
3 What is the correct interpretation of “for private ends”? 
It’s no secret that a lot has been written about piracy and its definition. This is also true for the  
criterion “for private ends” which has been subject to thorough scrutiny. Though no one seems 
to conclude authoritatively,37 theorists are generally divided into two schools of thought: 
 
On the one hand there is the private/political standpoint, excluding any act that are politically 
or ideologically motivated, such as terrorism and environmental activism, from being piracy.38 
This view is supported by, amongst others, the Harvard Draft Convention and Commentary 
(Harvard Draft)39 and Crockett40 as well as Rothwell and Stephens.41  
 
 
36 Pellet, A., 2012, Part Three Statute of the International Court of Justice, Ch.II Competence of the Court, Article 
38, in The statute of the international court of justice: A commentary by A. Zimmermann, Oxford University Press, 
para. 248 
37 E.g. Honniball, A. N., 2015, Private Political Activists and the International Law Definition of Piracy: Acting 
for Private Ends, 36, Adelaide Law Review, 279-328, p. 327.  
38 Petrig, A., 2015, “Piracy”, in Rothwell, D., et al. (eds), in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Oxford 
University Press, p. 847 
39 Harvard Draft Convention and Annexes, 1932, Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, 26, 
739-886, p. 786 
40 Crockett, C. H., 1976, Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy, 26, DePaul L. Rev. 78, p. 79 
41 Rothwell D. R. and Stephens, T., 2016, The International Law of the Sea, 2nd edition, Hart publishing, p. 162  
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Crawford is amongst the scholars calling for such a narrow interpretation, and rejects that 
insurgents, with few exceptions, can perform piracy. He has stated that:  
“Ships controlled by insurgents may not, unless recognized as belligerents, exercise belligerent 
rights against the shipping of other states. (…) Opinions which favour the treatment of 
insurgents as ‘pirates’ are surely incorrect, save perhaps in circumstances where insurgents 
attack foreign-flagged private vessels in international waters (…)”.42  
He continues to remark that politically motivated acts by organized groups should not be 
regarded as pirates, testifying that:    
“Harassing operations by organized groups deploying forces on the high seas may have 
political objectives, and yet be neither connected with insurgency against a particular 
government nor performed by agents of a lawful government. Ships threatened by such 
activities may be protected, and yet the aggressors not be regarded as pirates”.43  
On the other hand, there is the private/public standpoint. Here, private means the opposite of 
public, making the perpetrators’ motives irrelevant.44 According to this view, all acts of 
violence that are not authorized by a state are regarded as private and may constitute piracy, if 
the other requirements are met. This view is suggested by Halberstam,45 Bahar46 as well as 
Guilfoyle.47 
 
The latter view gains some support by the only international case law identified in this paper, 
the previously mentioned Lotus case. The case was brought before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and concerned the aftermath of the collision between S.S. Lotus and 
S.S. Bozkour where eight Turkish nationals drowned after Bozkour was torn apart by Lotus. 
The main question for the court was whether or not Turkey had breached the international legal 
principle of jurisdiction, by instituting criminal proceedings against the crew of the French 
vessel Lotus when the accident occurred outside the territorial sea of Turkey. The vote of the 




44 Petrig, A., 2015, “Piracy”, in Rothwell, D., et al. (eds), in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Oxford 
University Press, p. 847 
45 Halberstam, M., 1988, Terrorism on the high seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on 
Maritime Safety, 82, American Journal of International Law, 269-310, p. 290.  
46 Bahar, M., 2007, ‘Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti- Piracy 
Operations’, 40, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1, 30-34, p. 32.  
47 Guilfoyle, D., 2014, "Piracy and Terrorism.", The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and 
International Perspectives, Ed. Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas, Hart Publishing, 33–52, p. 52.  
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In his statement Moore referred to a declaration by Hall and agreed that all acts of piracy has 
one thing in common, namely that “they are done under conditions which, render it impossible 
or unfair to hold any State responsible for their commission”.48 Moore further agreed with Hall 
in that piratical acts are not confined to “depredations or acts of violence done animo furandi’, 
but that a satisfactory definition ‘must expressly exclude all acts by which the authority of the 
State or other political society is not openly or by implication repudiated’".49   
Lying somewhere between these two counterpoints, Tanaka argues from a different 
perspective, proposing an overall assessment. He states that:  
“[i]t seems that illicit acts by organized groups for the sole purpose of achieving some political 
end cannot be automatically characterised as piracy. The private ends requirement should be 
examined by taking various factors into account, such as motives, ends, specific acts of 
offenders, the relationship between offenders and victims, the relationship between the 
offenders and the legitimate government, and reactions of third States”.50  
 
3.1 The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties – means of 
interpretation 
The VCLT was developed by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1947 with the object 
of promoting the development of international law and its codification.51 The ILC itself is a 
commission established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 in order to develop 
and codify international law.52 Aust has described the ILC process as drawing up existing and 
well-developed customary international law regarding treaties before making a set of draft 
articles.53 These draft articles were subsequently adopted in the VCLT in 1969.54  
 
The VCLT has become the primary tool for the interpretation of treaties and is regarded as the 
“bible” for practitioners,55 thus laying down the ground rules for the understanding of the 
 
48 Hall, W., 1924, International Law, in International Law by Shaw, M. N. (ed), 8, 233–34, paragraph 81 
49 Hall, W., 1924, International Law, in International Law by Shaw, M. N. (ed), 8, 233–34, paragraph 81 
50 Tanaka, Y., 2016, The International Law of the Sea, 2nd ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 380 
51 Aust, A. (2013), Modern Traty Law and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 5  
52 https://legal.un.org/ilc/ extracted September 12th, 2020  
53 Aust, A. (2013), Modern Traty Law and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 5 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid, p. 6 
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criterion «for private ends». Therefore, when establishing the meaning of the provisions in the 
VCLT, the ILC Commentary on its final draft articles and contained in its final rapport on the 
topic (ILC Commentary), is the single most important source of material.56 
 
The VCLT Art. 31 (1) states that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.” The fact that a treaty shall be interpreted in “good faith”, entails that 
the interpretation shall be conducted in a loyal manner and that the conclusion of the 
interpretation shall coincide with the common intentions of the parties.57 This requires that 
every step of the interpretation; the ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose, shall be 
conducted in good faith with the parties intention. The intention of the parties is therefore a 
continuous element in the following interpretation.  
 
Aware of the structure of the VCLT Art. 31, the ILC stated that one is not intended to give 
greater weigh to one particular factor, such as text or the intentions of the parties or the objective 
and purpose of the treaty.58 On the contrary, the ILC suggested that Art. 31 paragraph 1 “is the 
point of departure for any treaty interpretation”, however, “[a]ll means of interpretation in 
article 31, (...) are part of a single integrated rule”.59  
 
Moreover, the structure of the article is: 
“intended to ensure the balance in the process of interpretation between an assessment of the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose, on the one hand, 
and the considerations regarding subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in the 
present draft conclusions, on the other”.60 
 
The following part will therefore seek to discover the intention of the parties, first by examining 
the ordinary meaning of the provision, its context and its object and purpose and secondly by 
studying common subsequent practice and agreements. The findings in these sections will be 
interpreted in good faith, balanced against each other and finally be regarded as a whole.   
 
56 Ibid, p. 12 
57 Ruud, M., and Ulfstein, G., 2011, Innføring i folkerett, 4th edition, Universitetsforlaget, p. 89 
58 Aust, A., 2013, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, p. 206 
59 2018 United Nations General Assembly Official Records Seventy-third Session Supplement No. 10 (A/73/10) 
Part II, Conclusion 2 (1) p. 20.  
60 United Nations General Assembly, 2018, Official Records Seventy-third Session Supplement No. 10 (A/73/10), 
Part II, Conclusion 2 (1) p. 20. 
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After this procedure is done, the VCLT Art. 32 states that:  
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
according to article 31:  
(a)  leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b)  leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”   
 
The ILC report further states that supplementary means of interpretation in Article 32 is non-
exhaustive,61 and expressly mentions that subsequent practice which consists of conduct by one 
or more parties in the application of the treaty can be regarded as such.62 The weight of this 
practice, depends, inter alia, on its clarity and specificity.63  
The conduct of states, both in form of verdicts, but also other forms of official practice, will 
therefore be studied together in order to identify the practice itself, as well as its clarity and 
specificity. But first, the starting point for the interpretation is the treaty text itself. 
3.1.1 The VCLT Art. 31 (1): The general rule of interpretation 
3.1.1.1 Ordinary meaning 
The ordinary meaning of the criterion “for private ends” indicates that the act must have a 
private motive. A natural interpretation of the word “private” is something limited to one or 
more specific persons, and something that is not shared or intended to be shared with a wider 
or general population. If viewed within a spectre, the ordinary meaning of “private ends” lies 
somewhere between personal and public. Even though it lies closer to personal motives than 
public motives, it does not require personal ends. Regardless, the ordinary meaning of the 
criterion excludes all motives that are public from constituting piracy.   
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, which is widely regarded as an accepted authority  
 
61 United Nations General Assembly, 2018, Official Records Seventy-third Session Supplement No. 10 
(A/73/10), p. 20 
62 Ibid, p. 13 
63 Ibid, p. 14 
 
Page 13 of 60 
on the English language,64 and therefore relevant when interpreting the ordinary meaning of a word 
in English, “private” can have a number of similar, but nuanced meanings. First, it is defined as 
something “restricted to one person or a few persons as opposed to the wider community; 
largely in opposition to public». A second definition is “[r]estricted to or for the use or 
enjoyment of one particular person or group of people; not open to the public». A third meaning 
of the word is «[o]f or relating to a service provided on a paying basis, as opposed to through 
the State or another public body.”  
 
When examining the ordinary meaning of the English term, there seems to be three common 
denominators across the different interpretations. First, “for private ends” would seem to 
require a motive. The wording would therefore seem to indicate that the assessment criterion is 
not whether or not the act is authorized by a state, but rather focusing on the motive for the act. 
Second, the meaning of “private” is focused on motives that are identifiable to one person or a 
smaller group of people. Third, and closely related to the second meaning, is that it clearly 
delimitates against actions committed by public authorization.65 However, the ordinary 
meaning remains silent on the exact line of demarcation regarding what motives, if any, that 
are not purely public, can be regarded as private. 
 
The interpretation above is solely derived from the English text, which is one of six authentic 
versions of the LOSC. As stated in the VCLT Art. 33, the texts are equally authoritative in each 
language and are presumed to have the same meaning. However, if a comparison of the 
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning after interpreting through the lenses of Art. 31 
and 32, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of 
the treaty, shall be adopted. 
LOSC Art. 320 (1) explicitly states that all six languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish) are equally authentic, initiating the above-mentioned approach. As 
showed below, there may be some divergencies between the different authentic texts. After 
these are displayed and analysed, the question will be if an interpretation of Articles 31 and 32 
remove these differences, and if not, which meaning reconciles best after regarding its context 
 
64 https://public.oed.com/about/ extracted May 31st 2020 
65 NB. The LOSC contains a special provision, Art. 102, stating that if the crew of a warship, government ship or 
government aircraft have mutinied and commits acts of piracy, their acts are assimilated to acts committed by a 
private ship or aircraft in Art. 101, potentially fulfilling the cumulative criterions of piracy.  
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and object and purpose. However, this analysis is hard to divide into subsequent and separate 
steps, and its process will therefore be intertwined and commented later on in this chapter.  
But first, an interpretation of some of the authentic languages. The French version of Art. 101 
(1) (a) states that: 
“On entend par piraterie l'un quelconque des actes suivants,  
al tout acte illicite de violence ou de détention ou toute déprédation commis par l'équipage ou 
des passagers d'un navire ou d'un aéronef privé, agissant à des fins privées, et dirigé”  
The term “des fins privées”, translates to “for private purposes”, which has almost the exact 
same meaning as the English term “for private ends”. Churchill have compared the two texts, 
stating that the French text is “is identical to the English”.66  The French version therefore 
appears to support the interpretation of the English criterion.  
The Arabic text states: 
101 ةداملا  
ةنصرقلا فیرعت  
: ةنصرق لكشی ةیلاتلا لامعألا نم لمع يأ  
وأ فنعلا لامعأ نم ينوناق ریغ لمع يأ  (أ)           
ضارغأل بكتری بلس لمع يأ وأ زاجتحالا    
وأ ةصاخ ةنیفس باكر وأ مقاط لبق نم ةصاخ     
: جوم نوكیو ،ةصاخ ةرئاط      
     
Translated to English, and depending on the context, the criterion means a private or personal 
goal or motive, which stands in clear opposition to a motive that is public, official or collective. 
This interpretation seems to promote the private/public standpoint, but the interpretation still 
appears to add some nuances to the interpretation. Namely that both private and personal, public 
and collective acts can be covered. For example, acts of terrorism conducted on behalf of a 
larger group (collective) is not counted as terrorism, whilst malicious acts which are personal 
but not necessarily private motives, can be included.  
 
 
66 Churchill, R., 2014, "The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—Fit for Purpose?.", 
in Koutrakos, P. and Skordas, A., (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International 
Perspectives, Hart Publishing, 9–32, p. 16 
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Furthermore, Arabic is a rich language,67 and the writers of this version had multiple ways of 
writing both “private” and “ends”. For instance, there are several ways of writing “ends” or 
“motives”. The word chosen is “ ضارغأل » (li'aghrad) which has a very close meaning to the 
English version. The writers could instead have chosen the word “ تایاغلا ” (alghayat), also 
meaning motive, but with quite different nuances. The latter term would describe an objective 
that stretches over a period of time, an object which is deeply rooted in the individual or a 
highly strategic motive. Though there are many possibilities when defining the criterion in 
Arabic, the writers nevertheless went with a text that means the same as the English version. 
The Arabic text therefore seems to confirm the English and French text in the necessity of a 
motive and not only the lack of sanction by a state.  
The fact that the Arabic criterion corresponding to the English word “private” can mean both a 
personal purpose and a private purpose is interesting. A personal purpose is something 
subjective and closely connected to the person, like love or hate, or possibly a personal 
conviction of moral or politics. A private purpose, on the other hand, is something that is not 
shared with a state, organization or a wide group of people, perhaps something kept for oneself. 
A prime example is robbery for private gain. By covering both motives, the Arabic text does 
not prefer one or the other motive but seems to widen the scope of the criterion to cover both 
private and personal motives.  
Further, when interpreting the criterion in the context of the whole provision, a peculiar 
discovery is made. The Arabic word for piracy which is used in different forms in the text, 
“Qursanah”, could indicate a much wider interpretation than the English text and also a much 
wider interpretation than the meaning of the Arabic criterion. The word “Qursanah”, stems from 
the French term «lettres de course», originally referring to the letters given from the ottoman 
sultan authorising attacks on French vessels. Bearing in mind the Arabic tradition of giving 
great respect to the origins of languages,68 and the fact that this word was not created, but 
adopted to mean pirates, it might suggest that the criterion read in its context could indicate that 
a much wider interpretation should be taken into account, namely that privateers also could 
conduct piracy. As this interpretation cannot be supported in good faith, by the other languages 
and not by practice nor theory, such an understanding must be discarded, cf. the VCLT Art. 31 
and 32.  
 
67 https://snl.no/arabisk, extracted 14th August 2020 
68 https://snl.no/arabisk, extracted 9th August 2020 
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A similar interpretation to the Arabic version is found in the Russian text. Art. 101 starts: 
“Пиратством является любое из перечисленных ниже действий:  
1. a)  любой неправомерный акт насилия, задержания или любой грабеж, 
совершаемый с личными целями экипажем или пассажирами какого-либо 
частновладельческого судна или частновладельческого летательного аппарата 
и направленный”  
The Russian version of the criterion is «совершаемый с личными целями» (sovershayemyy 
s lichnymi tselyami). Translated to English it can mean both «for personal purposes» or «for 
private purposes». This discovery clearly supports the interpretation of the Arabic version, 
where both private and personal motives are embraced.  
 
The Spanish text stands in more contrast to the English version. Art. 101 (1) states that: 
“Constituye piratería cualquiera de los actos siguientes:  
a) Todo acto ilegal de violencia o de detención o todo acto de depredación cometidos con un 
propósito personal por la tripulación o los pasajeros de un buque privado o de una 
aeronave privada y dirigidos” 
Here the criterion is “con un propósito personal”. Churchill also comments on this text, stating 
that “the Spanish ‘propósito personal’ translates as ‘personal purpose’, which probably means 
almost the same as the English and French texts”.69  This assumption is, however, not entirely 
correct. The term “con un propósito personal” translated to English means a personal purpose 
in life, a personal goal or something that one wants to achieve in life. The word “personal” is 
in both Spanish and English something closely connected to or identified with the person in 
question. Further, the word “con”, meaning “and” clearly highlights the significance of the 
personal purpose or goal. This version would therefore seem to correspond poorly with the 
private/political theory, where the motive is irrelevant if the act is not authorised by a state.  
A narrow interpretation of the Spanish text could in fact indicate that robbery, whilst clearly 
being a private motive, might not fulfil the Spanish criterion of a personal motive in life. An 
 
69 Churchill, R., 2014, "The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—Fit for Purpose?.", 
in Koutrakos, P. and Skordas, A., (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International 
Perspectives, Hart Publishing, 9–32, p. 16 
 
Page 17 of 60 
act of robbery could thus fall outside of the scope of Art. 101. However, such an outcome is 
not a result of the ordinary meaning when interpreted in good faith. The obvious fact that 
robbery could constitute piracy is confirmed by several authors,70 including Lauterpacht which 
wrote that:  
“Piracy, in its original and strict meaning, is every unauthorised act of violence committed by 
a private vessel on the open sea against another vessel with intent to plunder (animo furandi). 
The majority of writers confine piracy to such acts, which indeed are the normal cases of 
piracy”.71  
 
Such a narrow interpretation would also correspond poorly with the rules of treaty interpretation 
set forth in the VCLT Art. 31 and 32.  
 
Nevertheless, some conclusions may be drawn from the ordinary meaning of the texts studied. 
First, the different texts correspond well when they are interpreted together as a whole.  
 
As the Spanish text indicates a personal motive while the French and English texts suggest a 
private motive, the nuances discovered might lead to a conflict between the two motives as to 
which would prevail. However, since the Arabic and Russian texts highlights that the criterion 
equally can mean both personal and private motives, this view seems to gain support from all 
the different texts studied. As the treaty and criterion shall be interpreted in good faith and be 
regarded as a whole, the first conclusion to be drawn is that both motives, that is private and 
personal, seems to be covered by the criterion.  
 
A second conclusion to be drawn from the ordinary meaning of the different texts, is that the 
act should have a motive before it is proper to consider it as piracy. This conclusion stems from 
the fact that the Spanish text clearly suggests a motive, “con un propósito personal” (my 
emphasis) and further gains support from the other studied texts as well.    
 
A third conclusion is that acts conducted with state authorization cannot be regarded as piracy. 
This appears clear from the Arabic criterion, where the words used to describe the motive is an 
 
70 Guilfoyle, D., 2017, Art. 101, in Proelss, A., (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A 
commentary, p. 740; implied by Honniball, A. N., 2015, Private Political Activists and the International Law 
Definition of Piracy: Acting for Private Ends, 36, Adelaide Law Review, 279-328, p. 287; etc.  
71 Jennings, R., 2008, Part 2 The Objects of International Law, Ch. 6 The high seas, Piracy and Related Offences, 
in Oppenheim's International Law: Volume 1 Peace (9th Edition), ed. By Lauterpacht, H., 746-755, p. 747 
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antonym to a motive that is public, official or collective, and is further supported by the English 
and French version and corresponds well with the ordinary meaning of the Spanish and Russian 
texts as well.  
 
The ordinary meaning of the texts does not, however, identify in detail what motives can be 
regarded as private or public, or what motives fall outside of the criterion.  
3.1.1.2 Context 
The VCLT Art. 31 (1) further guides the course of interpretation to an examination of the 
context of the criterion “for private ends”. This includes the grammatical construction of the 
provision,72 its location in the Convention as well as other articles that might shed a light on the 
interpretation of the treaty. Besides, Gardiner argues in relation to the context, that it would be 
difficult to accept that the same wording used several places in the same agreement, could have 
completely different meanings.73 
 
But first, it is important to study the textual context in order to find the intention of the parties. 
This was highlighted in the ICJ judgement Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute74. One 
of the issues for the court was whether the ICJ had authority to delimit disputed maritime 
boundaries, an authorisation which had to be given either expressly in words or through the 
correct interpretation of the agreement between the parties. The court did not find support for 
its decision in the ordinary meaning of the treaty but deviated from the ordinary meaning and 
based its interpretation of the word on a wider analysis. The court stated that:  
“(… ) the word must be read in its context; the object of the verb ‘determine’ is not the maritime 
spaces themselves but the legal situation of these spaces. No indication of a common intention 
to obtain a delimitation by the Chamber can therefore be derived from this text as it stands”. 
 
Not only did the textual context itself, but also the wider context when examining the agreement 
as a whole, advocate for this solution. This example shows that the context of the provision can 
be given determining weight when it establishes the true intention of the parties. Accordingly, 
a study of the context of the criterion in question follows below.  
 
72 Gardiner, R. K., 2017, Part II Interpretation Applying the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A The 
General Rule, 5 The General Rule: (1) The Treaty, its Terms, and their Ordinary Meaning, in Treaty 
interpretation, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 161-222, p. 199 
73 Ibid 
74 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) 
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The term “for private ends” is only found once in the LOSC, in Art. 101 (1) (a). However, the 
highly debated word “private” is used four times in only two provisions, including the 
aforementioned one. In LOSC. Art. 101 (1) the word is used as follows:  
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed”.  
Here, the word «private» is used three times. The first time is the criterion subject to this study, 
whilst the second and third time the word is used, it seems to be used as a contrast to a warship 
or other state owned or operated ship which are given immunity in Art. 95 and 96. The use of 
“private” thus highlights the delimitation between state owned or operated vessels and non-
state vessels.  
The last use of the word “private” in the LOSC is found in Art. 102:   
“The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or 
government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are 
assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft.” 
This is the clearest use of the word “private”, where acts committed by government vessels or 
warships may also be regarded as piracy if the crew has mutinied. A natural understanding of 
the provision entails that the vessels are no longer “governmental”, but rather “private”.  The 
sharp distinction may indicate that the term “private” is meant as the opposite of public. So, the 
study of context may indicate that the word “private” is meant to describe “non-governmental” 
continuously throughout the convention, including the criterion “for private ends”.  
However, as Honniball has written, this argument is unconvincing.75 This is due to the fact that 
LOSC Art. 102 is a special provision, only applicable in very unique circumstances, which 
severely limits its transfer value. Honniball further argues that the parties to the LOSC have 
accurately used the terms “non-governmental” and “natural or juridical persons” when referring 
 
75 Honniball, A. N., 2015, Private Political Activists and the International Law Definition of Piracy: Acting for 
Private Ends, 36, Adelaide Law Review, 279-328, p. 289 
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to a situation that is non-governmental, cf. Art. 169 (1) and 139 (1).76 This is an indication that 
the word “private” is not necessarily intended to mean non-governmental.  
The fact that LOSC uses the word “private” several times in a similar manner, does not 
automatically mean that it was the party’s intention to interpret the word equally in the criterion 
“for private ends”. Unlike the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, where the words 
objectives were not disputed77 and the meaning of the words first changed when interpreted 
within a greater context, the meaning of the term “private ends” in Art. 101 is heavily disputed. 
Though it can be possible to alter the meaning of a clear text, as shown in the abovementioned 
case, it might be even harder to alter the meaning of a text subject to great dispute, as one lacks 
even a basis from where to draw such an altering conclusion.  
Furthermore, the other uses of the word “private” in LOSC are used to describe the status of a 
vessel, not to describe a motive. It is not given that the word used to describe both vessels and 
motives, are to be understood equally in the different situations, specifically since the Oxford 
English Dictionary gives several different meanings to the word when it’s used in different 
settings. Furthermore, as noted by Honniball, the criterion found in the LOSC “is 'private ends', 
not 'private'. He argues that “By removing the word from its context and surrounding text one 
risks differing interpretations from the term itself”.78 The argument behind this statement is 
that a word can alter its meaning by the context in which it is found. When using the word 
“private” alone, it can mean several things, including an antonym to the word “public”. Still, 
when the word is used in a term, such as “for private ends”, the meaning might alter. As stated 
previously in the paper, the term covers something that is individual or shared with only a 
smaller group of people. The meaning of “for private ends” does therefore not seem to have an 
equivalent meaning to “non-public” or the lack of state authorization. This is particularly 
apparent when considering that the Spanish versions of the LOSC means “personal motive in 
life”, an interpretation supported by the Russian and Arabic text. Since the criterion “for private 
ends” also encompasses the meaning of “personal motive in life”, it seems unlikely that the 
term is to be understood as “non-public”.  
 
76 Ibid 
77 The ICJ stated: “the word must be read in its context; the object of the verb ‘determine’ is not the maritime 
spaces themselves but the legal situation of these spaces” (para. 373) without further discussion. It seems 
therefore that the meaning of the word in fact was undisputed.  
78 Honniball, A. N., 2015, Private Political Activists and the International Law Definition of Piracy: Acting for 
Private Ends, 36, Adelaide Law Review, 279-328, p. 288 
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Another interesting observation is the fact that some of the other criteria have been interpreted 
expandingly, but not dynamically, to fit the wishes of the international community. An example 
is the criterion that the attack must be “directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship”, a 
criterion which is often referred to as the «two ship»-requirement. The ordinary meaning of 
“ship” is a large boat. However, the provision is interpreted expansively to not only mean larger 
boats, but also skiffs.79 This entails that at least parts of the provision have been interpreted 
expansively, indicating that the context might allow for a wider interpretation in regard to the 
other criterions as well. Still, in spite of the current expressed intention of some parties to the 
convention, the criterion has not been interpreted dynamically to apply to violent acts 
committed by the crew or passengers of the same ship.  
Quite the contrary, the adoption of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)80 was a direct response to the Achille 
Lauro incident and the fact that the case did not constitute piracy under the LOSC.81 The 
sponsoring states behind this new convention, Austria, Egypt and Italy, explicitly named the 
two-ship requirement and the private ends criterion as some of the reasons for why a new 
convention was needed.82 Furthermore, the Special Representative of the LOSC, Satya Nandan, 
and the Italian Minister of Justice, Guiliano Vassalli, stated that the “private end” criterion 
would not be met by maritime terrorism; thereby making the provisions on piracy in the LOSC 
inapplicable.83  
With this backdrop, the SUA Convention was concluded successfully in 2005 and has been 
ratified by a total of 156 states. In its preamble the parties are:  
“BEING CONVINCED of the urgent need to develop international co-operation between States 
in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention of all unlawful 
 
79 E.g. The Republic v. Mohamed Ahmed Dahir and 10 Others, The Supreme Court of the Seychelles, case no. 
51/2009, verdict, 26.07.2010 
80 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 14 October 2005 
81 Honniball, A., 2015, Private Political Activists and the International Law Definition of Piracy: Acting for 
Private Ends, Adelaide Law Review, 36(2), 279-328, p. 305 
82 IMO Doc PCUA 1/3, 3rd February 1987, Annex 2  
83 Natalino Ronzitti, 1990, 'The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against Terrorist Activities' in Natalino 
Ronzitti (ed.), Maritime Terrorism and International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1, p. 7 citing 
International Maritime Organisation, Record of Decisions of the Sixth Meeting Held at 11 am on 10 March 1988 
(International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
Rome, 1-10 March 1988), IMO Doc SUA/CONF/RD 13 (20 February 1989), 
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acts against the safety of maritime navigation, and the prosecution and punishment of their 
perpetrators”.  
These statements prove that most parties to the LOSC, even though being convinced that there 
is a need for a wider regulation of unlawful acts at sea, still regards themselves as bound by the 
restrictions set forth in the LOSC, both in regards to the two ship-requirement and the criterion 
of “for private ends”. When looking at the context and the practice of the state parties combined, 
there is reason to show moderation in the interpretation of the criterions of the LOSC Art 101.  
A similar conclusion, that the criterion should be interpreted literally, or at least moderately, 
can be drawn when studying Art. 101 and 102 in conjunction. This is because Art. 102 expressly 
mentions one exception where the criterion “private ship” in Art. 101 should not be interpreted 
moderately or literally, but that the criterion also can encompass warships or government 
vessels in case the crew has mutinied and conducted otherwise piratical acts. The express 
mention of when the criterion has a substantially wider scope than the ordinary meaning 
indicates, can lead to the assumption that this is the only situation where the criterion correctly 
can be interpreted in a significantly broader or analogically way. If the criterion was not 
supposed to be interpreted moderately in all other situations, there would be no need for a 
specific provision to broaden its scope under certain circumstances.  
These latter arguments support the presumption that if the parties intended to include several 
acts than simply those that were more motivated by «private» or «personal» ends, they should 
have specified it in the words used or at least in a special provision, similarly to the method 
chosen in regard to “private ship” and Art. 102. Such an approach has not only shown to be 
manageable (as it is already conducted) but would find support in the treaty as a complete 
framework for the law of the sea. 
A recap of this subchapter shows arguments going in different directions. Whilst the ordinary 
meaning of the criterion “for private ends” does advocate for a literal interpretation by 
supporting the need of a motive, the assumptions drawn from the provision’s context is more 
ambiguous. One can make the argument that the context does support a wider interpretation of 
the criterion to include all acts that lacks state authorisation, while the opposite assumption is 
equally as correct. The context viewed in the light of practice of the parties, advocates for a 
modest interpretation. A definite conclusion from the context is, unfortunately, hard to draw.  
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Further guidelines regarding the treaty’s context is given in the VCLT. Art. 31 (2) reads:  
“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty.”  
 
The preamble of the LOSC is of interest in this interpretation, however, it seems more fit to 
discuss this element under the next means of interpretation, the object and purpose of the treaty 
because of its entanglement. The preamble will therefore be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
Other key words in this paragraph are “made between all the parties” and “accepted by the other 
parties”. There are no agreements relating to the treaty that is concluded by all the parties. 
Furthermore, there are no instruments made in connection with the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties. Hence, reference to the context in VCLT Art. 31 (2) will only be made in regard 
to the preamble and be conducted below. 
3.1.1.3 Object and purpose  
The next means of interpretation in order to discover the correct meaning if the criterion “for 
private ends”, is the “object and purpose” of the treaty and provision. One of the ordinary 
meanings of the word “object” is, according to the Oxford Learners Dictionary, “purpose”.84 
The word “purpose”, however, is a synonym for “object”. The term thus seems to be a circular 
definition. Unfortunately, the term is not given a workable definition, and its meaning does vary 
in the VCLT.85 Fitzmaurice has described the term “in the light of its object and purpose” as 
being vague and ill-defined, thus being an unreliable tool for interpretation.86 Also practice 
from courts and tribunals vary, but tends to treat the term “object and purpose” as a single but 
broad remit.87  
 
84 https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/purpose?q=purpose, extracted 16th august 2020 
85 Jonas, D. S., & Saunders, T. N., 2010, The object and purpose of treaty: Three interpretive methods, 43, 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 565-610, p. 567 
86 Fitzmaurice, M., 2003, «The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties», in Evans, M. D. (Ed), International 
law, Oxford University Press, p. 182 
87 Gardiner, R., 2008, Treaty Interpretation, Oxford University Press, p. 193 
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However, Jonas and Saunders have thoroughly studied the term and stated that “[b]roadly 
speaking, it refers to a treaty's essential goals, as if a treaty's text could be boiled down to a 
concentrated broth - the essence of a treaty”.88 The authors concluded their study on the 
meaning of «object and purpose» of Art. 31 with stating that “object and purpose refers to the 
goals that motivated the drafting and ratification of a treaty. Therefore, it is natural to look to 
the motives of the people and institutions that held those goals”.89 
 
Gardiner seems to agree and has stated that the purpose of the treaty is the general result which 
the parties want to achieve by the treaty.90 He further identified a treaty’s preamble as a source  
of guidance.91 Another element of a treaty’s object and purpose is the principle of 
effectiveness.92 The meaning of this principle in relation to a treaty’s object and purpose, is that 
the instrument as a whole and each of its provisions must be presumed intended to achieve 
some end, and further that an interpretation that would make the text ineffective to achieve that 
object must be incorrect.93  
 
The LOSC’s preamble sheds some light on the object and purpose of the criterion “for private 
ends”. Two of the elements named in the preamble is the desire to have “due regard for the 
sovereignty of all States” and the promotion of “peaceful uses of the seas and oceans”. This 
latter element includes freedom of the high seas. Both elements are addressed several times 
throughout the convention,94 which strengthens the assumption that these components are 
pivotal to understand the correct interpretation of the provisions in the LOSC.  
 
Because Art. 101 is such a special provision by being the only article to grant truly universal 
jurisdiction, it might suggest that, in the special case of piracy, protection of the peaceful uses 
of the seas should be given heavier weight than the principle of sovereignty. This assumption 
would indicate that, in order to achieve the objective of peaceful use of the seas and freedom 
of navigation, the criterion should be interpreted to effectively achieves this goal, namely 
 
88 Jonas, D. S., & Saunders, T. N., 2010, The object and purpose of treaty: Three interpretive methods, 43, 
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94 Sovereignty: LOSC Art. 2, 236 etc.; Peaceful use of the seas and freedom of navigation: LOSC Art. 87, 88, 
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interpreting the term “for private ends” expandingly to allow universal jurisdiction in cases that 
clearly threatens the peaceful use of the sea.  
 
However, the principle of sovereignty is also found throughout the convention, is one of the 
objects and purposes of the treaty and is also a pivotal principle of modern international law.95 
Sovereignty should therefore not be taken lightly, and the weight attributed to the principle of 
effectiveness ought to be modest.  
3.1.2 VCLT Art. 31 (3): Subsequent practice  
It is now time to consider what subsequent agreements and subsequent practice do contribute 
to in regard to the interpretation of the criterion “for private ends”. The VCLT Art. 31 (3) 
demands that: 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties”. 
 
A side effect of the high number of state parties to LOSC is thus revealed: though several 
agreements, instruments and practices exist, not all of these are uniform or represent all the 
relevant parties. Especially the issue of piracy lacks uniform agreements, instruments and 
practices from all the participating states. Even though some agreements are highly endorsed, 
some states still remains outside their scope.96 This lack of conformity cannot be interpreted 
into a common intention of all the parties as written in the LOSC, and diverging views may not 
be used as a primary means of interpretation in accordance with the VCLT Art. 31 (3).  
Still, there are two common denominators that are accepted expressly or by tacit agreement that 
should be regarded as a relevant source of interpretation of LOSC. The first one is that the 
motive of robbery is included in the term “for private ends”, even though this might not follow 
 
95 Besson, S., 2011, Sovereignty, Oxford Public International Law, Oxford University Press, para 1 
96 Eg. Somalia is a party to the LOSC but not to the SUA Convention 
 
Page 26 of 60 
from the ordinary meaning of the Spanish text. The second one is that state authorized actions 
falls outside the definition, which is confirmed by the Arabic text and is further implied by the 
other texts. Since both of these lowest common denominators previously have been identified, 
little is to be gained by addressing them further.  
3.1.3 VCLT Art. 32 Supplementary means of interpretation 
The next means of interpretation in order to identify the correct meaning of “for private ends” 
are supplementary. When interpreting a treaty, VCLT Art. 32 states that:  
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
according to article 31:  
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”  
The list of supplementary means of interpretation in the VCLT Art. 32 is non-exhaustive.97 The 
ILC mentions in particular that subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, which does 
not establish the agreement of all parties to the treaty, but only of one or more parties, may be 
used as a supplementary means of interpretation.98 As there is a lack of uniform practices and 
agreements following the LOSC on the issues of the definition of piracy, this source becomes 
ever more important. 
In an official record of the International Law Commission from 2018,99 the ILC confirms that 
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice can help identify the “ordinary meaning” of a 
particular term by endorsing a narrow interpretation among the different possible shades of 
meaning of the term.100 This was the case in the ICJ  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion.101 However, subsequent agreements and practices might also do 
the opposite, namely avoiding to limit the meaning of a general term to just one of the different 
possible meanings.102 An example is the Case concerning rights of nationals of the United 
 
97 United Nations General Assembly, 2018, Official Records Seventy-third Session Supplement No. 10 
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States of America in Morocco.103 An expansive interpretation may also “indicate a wider range 
of possible interpretations or a certain scope for the exercise of discretion that a treaty grants 
to States”.104 The purpose of these interpretations, whichever way it goes, is thoroughly 
addressed in the VCLT and the ILC Report to be the identification of the intention of the 
parties.105  
However, the ILC Report does not consider whether subsequent practice which is not “in the 
application of the treaty” should be dealt with as a supplementary means of interpretation, and 
its status is therefore uncertain.106 Practice of related treaties, such as the SUA Convention, will 
therefore not be addressed here.  
3.1.3.1 Preparatory work  
Now the time has come to examine what the preparatory works can reveal about the correct 
interpretation of the criterion. The preparatory work during the negotiations of the LOSC was 
not elaborate or subject to thorough debate, and the definition of piracy in LOSC Art. 101 is 
almost identical to the corresponding provision in the HSC.107 In the book “The Law and 
Practice of Piracy at Sea", Churchill argues that the preparatory work to the HSC is relevant as 
the preparatory work for the provisions regarding piracy in the LOSC. He argues that because 
of the similarity between the provisions and the fact that there was a lack of independent debate 
before the provisions were “copied” from one convention and to the other, leads to the 
impression that the negotiators were satisfied with the previously agreed provisions.108 Because 
of this, he claims that the preparatory work to the HSC by the ILC can be viewed as part of the 
preparatory work of LOSC within the meaning of VCLT Art. 32.109 The same rationale can be 
argued in favour of viewing also the works from the Report from the League of Nations (League 
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Though preparatory works are not primary means of interpretation, Guilfoyle argues that the 
historical context is pivotal for the interpretation of the criterion: “[i]ndeed, the very origins of 
the words ‘for private ends’ as a part of the definition of piracy can only be understood in this 
context”.110 
 
But first and in connection to the historical context of the criterion, the earliest use of the term 
“for private ends” was written by Bishop already in 1892, several decades before the works of 
the League of Nations. His book, New Commentaries on the Criminal Law upon New System 
of Legal Exposition, marked the beginning of the debate regarding the term. Bishop wrote that: 
“Piracy - is robbery or any other like forcible depredation on the high seas, committed for gain 
or other private ends, in a spirit of hostility to mankind”.111 Bishops listed two sources behind 
this definition: the US v Palmer 16 US (3 Wheaton) 610 (1818) and US v Terrell, Hemp 411. 
However, the exact location that formed the basis for the term remains uncertain, as the former 
case does not use the phrase, and since the latter case has not been found by Guilfoyle nor 
me.112  
League of Nations  
The earliest “preparatory works” studied is the League of Nations Report. In the report of the 
sub-committee to the League of Nations, M. Matsuda, Rapporteur, and M. Wang Chung-Hui, 
representative from China and former Deputy Judge of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, declared the following:   
“In my opinion it is preferable not to adopt the criterion of desire for gain, since it is both too 
restrictive and contained in the larger qualification “for private ends”. It is better, in laying 
down a general principle, to be content with the external character of the facts without entering 
too far into the often delicate question of motives. Nevertheless, when the acts in question are 
committed from purely political motives, it is hardly possible to regard them as acts of piracy 
involving all the important consequences which follow upon the commission of that crime”.113  
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This view was maintained in their draft provision. Art. 1 states that:  
“Piracy occurs only on the high sea and consists in the commission for private ends of 
depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons.  
It is not involved in the notion of piracy that the above-mentioned acts should be committed 
for the purpose of gain, but acts committed with a purely political object will not be regarded 
as constituting piracy”.114 
The statement and corresponding draft provision seem to support the private/political 
standpoint. Ambassador Matsuda made further remarks regarding what acts would be excluded 
from the definition, testifying that:  
“[a]ccording to international law, piracy consists in sailing the seas for private ends without 
authorization from the Government of any state with the object of committing depredations 
upon property or acts of violence against persons”.115  
This statement does not only exclude all acts that falls under state authorization, it also demands 
that the sailing was conducted for private ends and that the object was committing depredations 
or acts of violence. The latter statement is not clear in distinguishing between motive, state 
authorization and the act of violence, but is presumably a hybrid between the private/political 
and private/public standpoint, in addressing both the need of a private end and the lack of 
authorization from any state.  
Matsuda further elaborated his view, arguing that “(…) when the acts in question are committed 
from purely political motives, it is hardly possible to regard them as acts of piracy”.116 This 
view gains support by the broader Committee stating that “purely political motives’ would 
exclude an act from being piracy”.117  
On this basis it appears sound to conclude that the League of Nations were determined to 
exclude purely political acts from constituting piracy in their draft. This standpoint, that 
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political motives does exclude an act from constituting piracy has been supported in recent 
theory in the previously mentioned statement by Crawford in page 8-9.  
Harvard Draft 
The objective of the Harvard Draft was to gather the legal sources relevant to piracy and to 
formulate a draft convention on the subject.118 It is important to specify that the drafters of the 
Harvard Research did not attempt to codify a rule that was reconciled with actual state practice 
and judicial pronouncements, rather their mission was to propose a rule based on analytical 
clarity.119 They stated that:  
“Finally, it may be useful to explain the paucity of pertinent cases and of evidence of modern 
state practice on most of the important moot points in the law of piracy. Except for a few 
international cases, chiefly concerning the status of insurgent vessels or of irregular privateers, 
and a few municipal law cases, there are no official determinations which will help an 
investigator to cut a way through the jungle of expert opinion. Indeed, the lack of adjudicated 
cases and of pertinent instances of state practice is the occasion for the chaos of expert opinion. 
Most of the municipal law cases on piracy are of little value in solving the international 
problems, because municipal law covers a different field, as a preceding part of this 
introduction explains, and the judicial opinions are colored by the national legislation”.120  
After examining the various sources, the drafters did not entirely adopt the approach proposed 
by Ambassador Matsuda.121 And in draft Article 3, their definition of piracy encompassed “Any 
act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison 
or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends without bona fide 
purpose of asserting a claim of right (...)”.122 This indicates that the drafters wanted to include 
both “private” and “personal” motives, but not necessarily political motives.  
The term “for private ends” in the Draft provision were mainly in line with Matsuda’s proposal, 
but his supplementary sentence “acts committed with a purely political object will not be 
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regarded as constituting piracy”, was omitted.123 The statement that purely political objects 
would not constitute piracy is mentioned four times in the Harvard Draft, as well as in 
‘Appendix 1, Matsuda’s Draft Provisions’. The reason for the omission in the final Harvard 
Draft provision is not explained, but when mentioned in the report, the issue did not seem to 
generate much dispute and the drafters might therefore have meant that it was unnecessary to 
include it in the final draft. 
Another interesting observation is that the choice of including the criterion “for private ends” 
in the Harvard Draft was somewhat in conflict with earlier practice. The inclusion was, 
nevertheless, deliberate. On page 798 the drafters discussed what acts would meet the criterion:  
“Although states at times have claimed the right to treat [unrecognized insurgents pretending 
to exercise belligerent rights against neutral commerce and privateers violating the policy of 
the captor as pirates], and although there is authority for subjecting some cases of these types 
to the common jurisdiction of all states, it seems best to confine the common jurisdiction to 
offenders acting for private ends only. There is authority for the view that this accords with the 
law of nations. The cases of acts committed for political or other public ends are covered by 
Article 16. The explanation of this treatment is given under that article.”  
 
This approach clearly delimitates between private ends on one side, and political and public 
ends on the other side, concluding that the former motive should be subject to the regime of 
universal jurisdiction, whilst the latter motives should not. The statement did not differentiate 
between recognized and un-recognized insurgents, as all insurgents were excluded from the 
special jurisdictional regime of piracy. Regarding political violence, insurgents and 
revolutionary organisations as something else than piracy, these acts were addressed in the 
abovementioned Art. 16. This draft provision stated that:  
“The provisions of this convention do not diminish a state's right under international law to 
take measures for the protection of its nationals, its ships and its commerce against interference 
on or over the high sea, when such measures are not based upon jurisdiction over piracy.” 
One of the reasons for omitting political acts, and specifically acts of insurgency from the 
definition of piracy was that “[t]hese cases often involve serious political considerations which 
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may direct the course of action of the offended State».124 Therefore, “[i]t is the better view, 
however, that these are not cases falling under the common jurisdiction of all states as piracy 
by the traditional law, but are special cases of offences for which the perpetrators may be 
punished by an offended state as it sees fit”.125  
This statement leaves the question as to whether or not the drafters intended that only the 
affected state could exercise jurisdiction in the same way as they could with regard to piratical 
attacks. The answer to this question is, unfortunately, not provided by the draft. Regardless of 
this open-ended question, Guilfoyle reflects on the draft provision noticing that “the authors of 
the Harvard Draft eventually favour a motives-based approach over the ‘unauthorised 
violence’ approach”126, indicating that the drafters favoured the private/political standpoint 
over the private/public position. 
International Law Commission  
Because of the lack of explanation for the use of the term and its intended meaning, it appears 
that the ILC simply lifted the words «for private ends» from the Harvard Research Draft and 
into its own articles without much debate.127 Guilfoyle therefore asks whether or not the ILC 
fully appreciated the progressive development of law that was conducted by the Harvard 
Research.128 Despite the lack of direct comment by the commission, its rapporteur, Francois, 
made some remarks in his initial draft. He argued that a requirement of an intention to rob 
would limit the definition more than it should, and appeared to endorse the Harvard Research 
position that ‘it seems best to confine the common jurisdiction [over piracy] to offenders acting 
for private ends only’,129 consequently excluding cases concerning government warships or 
civil war insurgencies.130  
The potential reach of the criterion remained undetermined, and neither the ILC nor Francois 
discussed the grey areas where a clarification was desired the most. Yet, because the ILC did 
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not disagree with the remarks in the Harvard Drafts about civil war insurgencies, it can be 
assumed that insurgents, recognised or not, would not be able to conduct piracy if attacking a 
vessel from its own state. Such a remark would be called for and expected if the ILC drafters 
opposed the reasoning of the draft provision that they copied. Whether or not the same position 
can be assumed in regard to attacks by insurgents that are directed at a vessel flying the flag of 
another state, is more uncertain. The closely connected issue of terrorism was also not addressed 
and neither was the modern concern for environmental activism. All in all, the works of the 
ILC delivered few revelations.  
The lack of thorough debate on piracy, which may be criticised, might also suggest that the 
Commission continuously agreed with the broad and transparent view of the Harvard drafters.  
When remembering that the mandate of the Commission had:   
“(… )the duty: 
(…) to examine the replies received; and  
(3) To report to the Council on the questions which are sufficiently ripe and on the procedure 
which might be followed with a view to preparing eventually for conferences for their 
solution”.131 
it seems fair to assume that the Commission would speak up if they disagreed with the works 
they based their conclusion on, especially if the disagreement was strong.  
Some conclusions can, however, be drawn from these three works, specifically that both the 
Harvard Draft and ILC have chosen a “motives” based approach, and not an approach making 
all illegal acts lacking state authorisation potential piracy actions. This view also seems to be 
supported implicitly in the work of the League of Nations. Another conclusion to be drawn is 
that the League of Nations, Harvard Draft and the ILC all seemed to omit purely political acts 
from the definition, such as attacks by civil war insurgents.  
Unfortunately, these documents do not contribute much to the delimitation of the grey areas. 
Furthermore, the weight given to these works, must not be exaggerated. Honnibal summarizes 
Guilfoyes’ arguments stating that such historical sources have been overrated in usefulness, as 
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they represent only the intentions of different codifiers and not LOSC drafters,132 and are not 
actual preparatory works to the present convention. This argument is further supported in the 
case of United States of America v Ali Mohamed Ali.133 Mr. Ali, who was charged with aiding 
and abetting piracy, attempted to rely on the Harvard Draft in order to evade prosecution.  
The verdict commented his attempt by stating that:  
“Ali's next effort to exclude his conduct from the international definition of piracy eschews 
UNCLOS's text in favor of its drafting history - or, rather, its drafting history's drafting history 
... Ali would have us ignore UNCLOS's plain meaning in favor of eighty-year-old scholarship 
that may have influenced a treaty that includes language similar to UNCLOS article 101. This 
is a bridge too far”.134   
These arguments are rational and well-constructed, and advocates that these preparatory works 
should be given modest weight.    
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea  
Some discussion regarding the criterion also took place during the negotiations of LOSC. On 
March 17th, 1958, Mr. Zourek, the representative from Czechoslovakia, made some interesting 
remarks. He commented that the omission of acts of violence and depredation committed on 
the high seas for other than private ends meant that acts covered by the definition and 
committed at the order or at the initiative of a state organ, could not be regarded as piracy.135 
This again, he stated, would be equivalent to admitting the order of a superior officer as an 
excuse for the commission of a crime and so would be a blatant contradiction of the principles 
which had become an integral part of international law.136 In this manner Mr. Zourek argued 
for a dramatical widening of the scope of the definition, possibly by regarding all acts of 
violence at sea as possible piracy acts, regardless of motive or authorization.  
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Mr. Zoureks’ opinion stands in great contrast to LOSC Art. 95 and 96, the majority view in the 
preparatory works described above and is also denied, nearly unanimously, by scholars.137  
A different view was advocated during the same meeting by Mr. Campos Ortiz of Mexico. He 
addressed "private ends" as an essential factor in the definition of piracy, but noted that the 
stipulated article did not include a paragraph stating that acts of violation or depredation 
committed by warships during a civil war were not acts of piracy, a note which he meant should 
be included in the article.138 Though his statement is somewhat ambiguous, it is likely that his 
announcement was meant to highlight the view that a warship should also be immune against 
universal jurisdiction granted in cases of piracy in every situation, also during a civil war. He 
also recommended that, as proposed by the League of Nations, that the relevant provision 
should mention that acts committed for purely political ends would not be regarded as acts of 
piracy.139 Ortiz’ view follows the conclusion of the Harvard Draft, namely that the correct 
interpretation of “for private ends” should delimitate against acts that have a purely political 
motive. 
Following the short debate addressing the provisions regarding piracy, none of the remarks 
made by the two delegates were taken into account, as the relevant provision in the HSC was 
copied almost verbatim into the definition in the LOSC Art. 101.  
 
These preparatory works (in the widest sense) seem to indicate that a motive is a prerequisite 
before an act can be considered piratical. This assumption is further in line with the 
interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the criterion in the different languages studied, 
specifically in regard to the Spanish version. Further assumptions to be drawn from these works 
is that the motive must be private. Also, this statement is confirmed by the ordinary meaning 
of several of the texts in this study. Additionally, even though these preparatory works do not 
expressly name what motives fall within or outside the criterion, several of them indicates that 
acts conducted for purely political motives would be excluded from potentially constituting 
piracy. However, if the acts mentioned were not purely motivated by politics, but also by, for 
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instance revenge or financial gain the acts could possibly also be regarded as conducted for 
private or personal ends, thus fulfilling the criterion.  
 
Neither the ordinary meaning of the treaty, its context, its object and purpose nor the preparatory 
works have provided clear instructions on how the criterion “for private ends” should be 
interpreted. Thus, one is forced to move along with the interpretation in line with the general 
rules stated in the VCLT Art. 31. 
3.1.3.2 State practice  
State practice is already mentioned as a supplementary means for the interpretation of the 
criterion «for private ends». The various practices are treated together and analysed against 
each other after a chronological presentation. 
 
Malek Adhel  
The brig Malek Adhel sailed from New York to California under the command of Joseph Nunez 
in 1840. The vessel was armed with a cannon, ammunition, pistols and daggers, as well as 
regular cargo. During its months at sea, the ship had committed piratical acts towards several 
vessels and the brig was later seized by a war ship belonging to the United States and sent to 
the port of Baltimore for adjudication. The claims regarding liability were founded upon an act 
of Congress to protect the commerce of the US, and to punish the crime of piracy. The case was 
processed by the supreme court in 1844.140 
The verdict holds that:  
"If he willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship without any other object than to 
gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as much piratical aggression, in the sense of 
the law of nations and of the act of congress, as if he did it solely and exclusively for the sake 
of plunder, lucri causa. The law looks at it as an act of hostility, and being committed by a 
vessel not commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare, it treats it as the act of a pirate, and 
of one who is emphatically hostis humani generis".141  
This case shows that the US seemed to use “hostis humani generis” as a more influential 
element in the assessment of whether or not the act was piratical, and not deciding by the 
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criterion “for private ends”. This is not surprising given that the first use of the term is found 
almost five decades later in the aforementioned book of J. Bishop.142 The description given in 
the textbook lies, however, very closely to the reasonings of the US Supreme Court this case 
and the books term can possibly be seen as a mere rewriting and a simplification of the 
description used in Malek Adhel. However, in later practice these elements have been omitted, 
possibly, with the exception of the Achille Lauro incident. 
Ambrose Light  
The issue for the court in case of the Ambrose Light143 was whether it was piracy or unlawful 
warfare for Columbian rebels, who had not been recognized by any foreign power, to seize a 
registered Columbian registered vessel. After resolving the question, the judge stated that: 
“The consideration that I have been able to give to the subject leads me to the conclusion that 
the liability of the vessel to seizure, as piratical, turns wholly upon the question whether the 
insurgents had or had not obtained any previous recognition of belligerent rights, either from 
their own government or from the political or executive department of any other nation; and 
that, in the absence of recognition by any government whatever, the tribunals of other nations 
must hold such expeditions as this to be technically piratical”.144 
The rationale behind this conclusion follows “logically and necessarily, both from the 
definition of piracy in the view of international law, and from a few well-settled principles”.145 
A similar conclusion had also been made in an earlier English, the Magellan Pirates146.  
In the Magellan Pirates case the Admiralty court held that:   
“[I]t does not follow that, because persons who are rebels or insurgents may commit against 
the ruling powers of their own country acts of violence, they may not be, as well as insurgents 
and rebels, pirates also; pirates for other acts committed towards other persons. It does not 
follow that rebels or insurgents may not commit piratical acts against the subjects of other 
states, especially if such acts were in no degree connected with the insurrection or 
rebellion”.147 
 
142 Bishop, J., 1892, 8, New Commentaries on the Criminal Law upon New System of Legal Exposition. Chicago, 
T.H. Flood and Co., p. 339. 
143 United States v. The Ambrose Light, etc., 1885, 25 F 408 
144 Ibid, p. 412 
145 Ibid 
146 The Magellan Pirates, 1853, 1 Spinks (Ecclesiastical and Admiralty), 81, 164 E.R 47 
147 Ibid at 48  
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After comparing the two cases, McGinley argues that they indicate that if the insurgents have 
international recognition of their status by states, acts performed by them in the furtherance of 
their rebellion will not be considered piratical.148 He further argues that if the insurgents have 
no international status, their acts will be considered piratical no matter what their motive 
because of the absence of recognition.149 Finally, he maintains that even though the insurgents 
have been recognized as such, depredations unconnected with the furtherance of their rebellion 
would still be considered piratical.150 McGinley thus seems to support a version of the 
private/public standpoint where he excludes all acts conducted under the power of a recognized 
authority. This assumption is in accordance with the reasonings of the two cases he studied. 
Though his arguments for differentiating between insurgents that are recognised with 
international status or not appear reasonable, his assumption discarding any motive as irrelevant 
fits poorly with the ordinary meaning of the texts, where specifically the Spanish version 
advocates strongly in favour of a motive. In this conflict, the ordinary meaning, which the 
parties negotiated and accepted, should be attributed more weight than the two national case 
laws that were decided more than a century ago.   
Bolivia Republic v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Co. Case  
The definition of piracy was a concern in the Bolivia Republic v. Indemnity Mutual Marine 
Assurance case.151 The facts of the case regarded insurance coverage for an act of robbery that 
occurred nearby the border between Bolivia and Brazil. In the case, the judges concluded that 
the act was not piratical for two reasons. Firstly, the act was conducted outside the geographical 
area where piracy could occur. Secondly, the act of robbery was motivated by political and 
social intentions and did therefore not meet the definition of piracy. A pirate, for the purposes 
of an insurance policy, was described by judge Vaughan Williams L.J, as:  
“a man who is plundering indiscriminately for his own ends, and not a man who is simply 
operating against the property of a particular State for a public end, the end of establishing a 
government, although that act may be illegal and even criminal, and although he may not be 
acting on behalf of a society which is, to use the expression in Hall on International Law, 
 
148 McGinley, G. P., 1985, The Achille Lauro Affair - Implications for International Law, Tennessee Law 
Review, 52, 691-738, p. 699 
149 Ibid 
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151 Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Insurance Company Ltd. 1909 1 K.B. 785; 1909 1 K.B. 792 
(C.A.) at 802 
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politically organized. Such an act may be piracy by international law, but it is not, I think, 
piracy within the meaning of a policy of insurance (...)”.152 
 
It is important to underline that the direct relevance of this quote is limited to insurance policy 
and that Williams do not conclude whether or not the act is piratical under international law. 
Nevertheless, another component of the statement is of more interest in the assessment of 
whether or not an act is piratical under international law, namely the element of 
“indiscriminate” violence. Exactly one century after this case, a question of the classification 
of an indiscriminate act of violence at the high seas was brought before the Supreme Court in 
the Seychelles. An assessment of the case, The Republic vs. Mohamed Ahmed Dahir & Ten 
others, will follow later.  
 
Santa Maria  
Over a century later the incident of the Santa Maria took place. Santa Maria was a Portuguese 
luxury cruise liner that was overpowered at high seas by some of its passengers on January 10th, 
1961. One of the passengers, Henrique Malta Galvão, a former Portuguese army captain and 
district governor in Angola, took over the command of the ship by violent means. While 
combating for control over the vessel, the third officer was killed, and an apprentice pilot was 
seriously wounded. The captain of Santa Maria was arrested by the rebels and the rest of the 
crew were forced to navigate at gun point. The hijacking was clearly motivated by political 
ends, as Captain Galvão announced that he had acted on behalf of the Portuguese "National 
Independence Movement", led by General Humberto da Silva Delgado, an opposition candidate 
for the presidency a few years earlier. The “National Independence Movement” was not in de 
facto control of any territory whereby it could claim the rights of a belligerent, but they were 
rather insurgents without recognition.  
 
The Portuguese called the overtaking a "piratical act" and invited other governments to hunt 
down the "pirates".153 Initially, United States’, British and Dutch warships were sent out to 
chase the vessel.154 A few days later, however, the United States and British governments 
expressed doubt as to the "piratical" character of the action and appeared to be mainly 
 
152 Ibid 
153 Vali, F. A., (1961-1962), Santa Maria Case, 56, Northwestern University Law Review, 168-175 p. 168 and 
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concerned with the passengers, many among them being their own nationals.155 These 
governments denied any intention of capturing the vessel by force, and even the existence of a 
"search and visit" order was disclaimed.156  
The overtaking of the Santa Maria could not be regarded as piracy by international law because 
it did not fulfil the cumulative criterions, including the lack of the two-ship requirement. 
However, Vali clearly indicates that the lack of “piratical” character of the act is not only due 
to the lack of the two-ship requirement, but equally as much due to the fact that the motive was 
public, not “private”.157 It is worth noticing that Brazil also reacted in a mild manner towards 
the rebels, granting them political asylum.158 Though it is far from certain, the mild-mannered 
reactions from the US, Britain and Brazil could indicate that these states doubted whether or 
not the acts of the rebels resembled piratical acts. This becomes more likely when compared to 
the reactions to the later hijacking of Achille Lauro, which also failed to be piracy due to the 
two-ship requirement. Specifically, the distinction in the approach of the US is worth noticing, 
as they were involved and had conflicting reactions to the two incidents. However, this position 
should not be granted extensive weight, as the latter case affected the US directly with the 
killing of an American citizen. Further discussion is conducted after the presentation of the 
Achille Lauro case. 
Castle John  
The issue in Castle John159 was whether or not an injunction could be granted to order 
Greenpeace from obstructing the dumping of waste on the high seas.160 The backdrop of this 
case was that members of Greenpeace had boarded a chemical dumping vessel twice with the 
use of force, as well as using a vessel to blockade another dumping vessel from passing through 
Antwerp harbour. As a result of the actions, the owner of the dumping licence and the affected 
vessels claimed damages against Greenpeace and the latter’s vessel was confiscated by Belgian 
authorities. The dispute was appealed twice and was brought before the Court of Cassation. 
A question for the Court of Cassation was whether or not the acts committed by Greenpeace 
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private ends”, under the definition of piracy in the High Seas Convention Art. 15. The defendant 
argued that the actions were taken “with a view to alerting public opinion” and did therefore 
not seek a private end regardless of the fact that the aim of protecting the environment also 
corresponded with objectives in the articles of its association. 
The court rejected this position and stated that:  
“The applicants do not argue that the acts at issue were committed in the interest or to the 
detriment of a State or a State system rather than purely in support of a personal point of view 
concerning a particular problem, even if they reflected a political perspective. On the basis of 
these considerations the Court of Appeal was entitled to decide that the acts at issue were 
committed for personal ends within the meaning (...) of the Convention [on the High Seas].”  
This statement indicates that the court laid weight on two elements when finding that 
environmental activism can be regarded as a private end. First, the fact that the act was not 
directed against or committed in the interest of a state. Second, that environmental activism, 
while being a political motive, supported a personal point of view, and could thus fall within 
the scope of the provision. Because both arguments were treated together it is impossible to 
conclude with certainty on whether the first, second or both elements in combination were the 
determining factor(s) in this case.  
This verdict displays several limitations and has rightfully received criticism from renowned 
scholars. Churchill briefly states that the «decision has been strongly criticised, and should 
probably be regarded as incorrect».161 Menefee elaborates his criticism, writing that the logic 
of the Court could implicate that “formalized state or anti-state action is necessary to show 
that an incident does not merely result from" a personal point of view reflecting a political 
perspective, and that this "would tend to mean that almost every nongovernmental act of 
violence could arguably be classified as piracy”.162  
Though this might be an accurate analysis of the ruling, Menefee wrote that the verdict would 
have been more helpful “in defining what was a private end rather than doing this indirectly 
by saying what was not a "public" end”.163 Since the Court did not define “private ends”, but 
rather argued the other way around, trying to define what was not a public end, the scope of the 
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term did not receive the awaited clarification one might have hoped for. Nevertheless, despite 
of the conflicting views regarding the verdict, one should be aware that also a US court of 
appeals took the same position as the Belgium Court of Cassation in the Sea Shepherd case.164 
Achille Lauro  
Achille Lauro was, in similarity to the Santa Maria, a cruise ship that was hijacked by 
passengers onboard. The hijackers were members of the Palestine Liberation Front, a division 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and their attack was accidental as they were 
discovered with weapons while planning another target in retaliation for the Israeli attack on 
the PLO headquarters.165 The crew and the passengers were held hostages, while the hijackers 
threatened to kill them unless Israel released 50 Palestinian prisoners. The hijackers also 
threatened to blow up the ship if a rescue mission was attempted. To demonstrate the 
seriousness of the situation, they shot and threw an American Jew, Leon Klinghoffer, along 
with his wheelchair, overboard. The US, through its President, Legal Adviser, and Justice 
Department characterised the seizure as piracy. This characterisation gained support by some 
scholars,166 but was opposed by others.167 After a negotiation with Egyptian authorities, the 
hostages were released in return for safe passage for the terrorists out of Egypt. Yet, on October 
10th, an Egyptian aircraft carrying the hijackers and Abbas, a co-conspirator, was intercepted 
by United States Navy planes and was forced to land at a NATO base in Sicily.168 Thereafter 
the US requested the extradition of all the terrorists.169 Sometime after the incident, the 
international community expressed a pressing need for extended jurisdiction in such cases, 
where the acts, though similar to piracy, would not meet the criteria of the LOSC, and started 
the negotiations on the SUA Convention.170  
If studied under the prospects of piracy, the facts in Achille Lauro were in fact quite similar to 
the realities of the Santa Maria incident. Both hijackings were done through illegal acts of 
violence where innocent people were killed, and the acts were conducted outside the territorial 
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sea of any nation. None of the hijackings constitutes piracy under international law because of 
the lack of the two-ships criterion and possibly also because the acts were not clearly committed 
“for private ends”. Lastly, none of the hijackers were recognized by the international 
community at the time of the attacks. The different responses might have several explanations.  
 
For the case of the US, probably the state with most conflicting responses, the issue can possibly 
be explained by the difference in the threats directed at American citizens and allies. The 
response of other states, however, might be explained by the fact that the Santa Maria incident 
was conducted and directed as a purely internal dispute, as opposed to the Achille Lauro 
incident. The reluctance to use force against the hijackers of Santa Maria could be influenced 
by the fear of touching to heavily on a politically delicate and entirely domestic situation, which, 
demonstrated by the Harvard Draft, is undesirable.171 However, the harsher treatment of the 
hijackers in the Achille Lauro incident, might also be attributed to the excessive use of violence, 
as demonstrated by the international killing of a disabled person, whom was a citizen of another 
state than the state that the attack was directed towards. This might suggest that states are less 
incline to regard insurgents as pirates, if the sole focus of the attack is on internal affairs. Such 
a view gains some support from the Magellan Pirates case, where acts directed towards “the 
ruling powers of their own country” may not be piratical but acts that are directed at “other 
states” were more inclined to be viewed as such.  
  
Another possible reason for the diverging reactions is that motives such as retaliation, hatred or 
similar are motives that presumably falls within the definition of piracy. This view finds support 
in the ordinary meaning of “for personal motives”. Also, the extended view, that any illegal act 
of violence can constitute piracy regardless of the motive is suggested by several authors.  
 
Blackstone, for instance, argued that the definition of a pirate did not stem from the motives of 
the act, but rather that he was an enemy against mankind because of the savage state of nature 
of the act:    
“the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation on the high seas, is an offence against the 
universal law of society; a pirate being (...) hostis humani generis. As therefor he has renounced 
all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself ... to the savage state of 
 
171 Harvard Draft Convention and Annexes, 1932, Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, 26, 
739-886, p. 857 
 
Page 44 of 60 
nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him 
(…)”.172  
 
A broad and somewhat similar statement is made by Guilfoyle, declaring that: 
“International practice now supports the view that politically motivated violence against 
civilians is in all circumstances unacceptable, and in the event of ambiguity this should clearly 
be the preferred interpretation”.173  
 
Here, Guilfoyle acknowledges that the term “for private ends” can be ambiguous, and that 
politically motivated violence against civilians in all circumstances should not be accepted. His 
conclusion is therefore that the preferred interpretation of the criterion should encompass such 
violent acts. His statement does therefore seem to be in line with the principle of effectiveness.  
 
The Republic vs. Mohamed Ahmed Dahir  
The Supreme Court of the Seychelles in the case of Republic v Dahir and 10 others was a 
criminal proceeding where eleven men were prosecuted for the attack of the coast guard patrol 
vessel “Topaz” in the exclusive economic zone of the Seychelles, in December 2009. The men 
were charged with seven different offences, where four offences regarded terrorism, whilst the 
remaining three offences were for piracy related crime. In the verdict, judge D. Gaswaga 
identified terrorism in accordance with national legislation to normally include “indiscriminate 
violence” with the objective of influencing governments of international organizations for 
political ends. Piracy, on the other hand, was defined to contain the motive of “private 
ends". The counts of terrorism were dismissed for all the accused, but the defendants were 
found guilty and convicted for acts of piracy.    
Churchill criticises the reasoning of The Supreme Court of the Seychelles in this case as 
potentially inconsistent if transferred to international law,174 arguing that if indiscriminate acts 
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of violence would preclude an act from being piracy, it could lead to an absurd result, 
necessitating a recourse of interpretation.175 
His criticism focused on the fact that terrorism was described to normally constitute of 
“indiscriminate acts of violence” and that the judge stated that “[s]uch acts could not be for 
‘private ends’”,176 seemingly differentiating between piracy and acts of indiscriminate 
violence. Churchill advocated that, if this argument was to be presumed, it could entail that a 
military vessel, contemplating the seizure of a skiff attacking an oil tanker, would not be able 
to distinguish between terrorism and mercenary (which is regarded as a private end and 
therefore piracy).177 If interfering, the military vessel would risks liability to the flag state of 
the skiff in accordance with LOSC Art. 106 if the skiff was “simply” conducting terrorism 
instead of piracy. If not interfering, and the motive of the perpetrators was in fact private 
mercenary, the skiff could continue its attack without interference and escape enforcement. 
Churchill called this result absurd and argued for a recourse of interpretation in accordance with 
VCLT Art. 32 (b).178   
According to Churchill, this distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate violence 
would probably not be applicable to environmental activism.179 This is because the attacks from 
eco-activism are, by nature, easily identifiable, so a warship would unlikely mistake the motive 
as private and the risk liability for unlawful seizure is therefore lower.  
I am inclined to follow Churchills reasoning to some degree. However, there are a couple of 
limitations to his arguments.  
 
First, his reasoning seems to be based on the term “indiscriminate violence” as the main 
divergency between what acts are considered as piracy and terrorism, stating that acts of 
indiscriminate violence “cannot be piracy”. The verdict, however, did not seem to rely heavily 
on this element when differentiating between the two types of crimes. The word 
“indiscriminate” was only used in one sentence. The word’s counterpart “discriminate”, was 
not used once. The reasoning of the court was elaborated in the verdict, where more weight 
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(vessel and cargo) for private ends at the high seas than assaulting or causing injuries to the 
crew, which is incidental to the main criminal act”, as opposed to terrorism (the main criminal 
act), which “usually involves indiscriminate violence with the objective of influencing 
governments or international organizations for political ends”, cf. paras 53 and 37. This verdict 
does not, at least explicitly, state that indiscriminate violence precludes an act from being 
piracy. It would therefore seem that Churchill has given determining weight to an element that 
was of minor significance to the court when distinguishing between the two crimes.  
 
Secondly, Churchill argued that the preclusion of indiscriminate acts of violence from the 
definition of piracy, and hence universal jurisdiction, would entail an absurd result for a warship 
contemplating the arrest of a skiff attacking another vessel for unknown reasons because of the 
fear of incurring liability.180 However, one can argue that the LOSC actually provides for the 
opposite solution.  
 
The LOSC Art. 106 only establishes liability for the state undertaking the arrest for loss or 
damage to the seized vessel if the seizure “had been effected without adequate grounds”. 
Guilfoyle writes that the rule “can be justified to deter abuse and may be falling within the 
scope of Art. 300, on good faith and abuse of rights (…)”.181 This seems to indicate that the 
threshold of “adequate grounds” is quite low.   
 
According to such a low threshold, in the example Churchill uses of a skiff attacking an oil 
tanker, the military vessel would not be in high risk of liability. A violent attack on an oil tanker 
would normally give a military vessel adequate grounds, within the meaning of Art. 106, for 
believing that the attack was motivated by private ends and therefore justifying seizure without 
risking liability. Consequently, the LOSC seems to protect warships against liability when 
encountering acts of indiscriminate violence.  
 
Though our rationale might be different, I still agree with Churchills conclusion, namely that 
this case cannot be used as an argument for excluding indiscriminate acts of violence from 
constituting piracy under international law. 
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In fact, the principle of freedom of navigation supports the hypothesis that “indiscriminate acts” 
can be a relevant factor in the consideration of whether or not an act is piratical. The principle 
of freedom of navigation was introduced by Hugo Grotius in Mare Liberum.182 Grotius believed 
that freedom of navigation and freedom of international trades were inviolable principles, a 
vision which is supported directly and indirectly several places in the Convention.183  
From the standpoint of the principle of effectiveness, this view might suggest that 
“indiscriminate acts of violence” should be covered by the definition of piracy, as these acts 
severely hamper with such rights. While attacks for the purpose of personal motives, such as 
love or revenge, and acts of environmental activism are usually easier to identify and to defend 
against, acts that are indiscriminate might affect every vessel without warning, making attacks 
impossible to protect against. The latter acts are thus harder to shield from, advocating for 
broader jurisdiction.  
Sea Shepherd  
The Sea Shepherd case,184 similarly to the case of Castle John, regarded environmental activism 
as piracy. One of the questions before the court was whether or not such motives were regarded 
as “private ends”, and thereby fulfilling the cumulative criteria in the definition of piracy in the 
LOSC Art. 101. The Court of Appeals rejected the district court’s interpretation as erroneous, 
when the district court limited “private ends” to acts pursued for financial enrichments.  
After an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of “private”, the Court of Appeals underlined 
that also the provision’s context argued in favour of a wider interpretation of the term. The 
Court concluded its position on “private ends” stating that:   
“(…) “private ends” include those pursued on personal, moral or philosophical grounds, such 
as Sea Shepherd's professed environmental goals. That the perpetrators believe themselves to 
be serving the public good does not render their ends public”.185  
As in the Castle John verdict, the court interpreted the criterion “for private ends” to include 
motives that are “personal”. This is in line with the ordinary meaning of the provision, when 
the criterion is regarded as a whole after an interpretation of the different texts. Yet, the court 
 
182 Grotius, H., 1609, Mare Liberum, sive De Jure quod Batavis Competit ad Indicana commercio. Leiden, 
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went further, stating that the criterion encompassed “moral or philosophical grounds” as well. 
The rationale behind this interpretation was found in the historical context of the criterion, 
where the word “private” was interpreted to be an antonym to “public”. This conclusion is not, 
in my view, correct. Rather than focusing and assumingly concluding on the basis of the 
historical context, the court should have studied the textual context. Further, the assumption 
that the historical context reveals the criterion to be an antonym to public is, at best, 
oversimplified. Several of the historical works constituting the basis for the criterion do in fact 
rule out “purely political” motives from the criterion.  
Honniball also criticised the verdict, sharply observing that:   
“The US Appeals Court in Sea Shepherd began by looking into the ordinary meaning of 
‘private’. This approach was mistaken. Firstly, the term of UNCLOS is ‘private ends’, not 
‘private’. By removing the word from its context and surrounding text one risks differing 
interpretations from the term itself. More importantly, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of private does 
not provide a decisive interpretation that either excludes or includes politically motivated ends. 
If private ‘is normally used as an antonym to public’ and ‘matters of a personal nature’ as the 
Court suggested, then a working definition only exists if those terms (public and personal) are 
clear. But these terms are equally ambiguous”.186   
There are more recent cases before national courts regarding piracy.187 However, the case of 
Sea Shepherd, is the latest case that I have found which truly studies the criterion “for private 
ends”. Therefore, despite that the verdict is subject to heavy criticism, it still represents one of 
the most vocal and recent standpoints to the interpretation of “for private ends”.  
 
It appears obvious when comparing these verdicts against each other that they interpret the 
criterion “for private ends” in diverging ways. Even though these practices are conflicting, it is 
important not to discard the different verdicts, stating that they give no guidance as to the correct 
interpretation of the criterion. Quite the contrary, the vast and different practices observed, give 
reason for another analysis: they all support the fact that many different and authoritative 
interpretations can and have be drawn from the criterion. In conclusion, practice in the form of 
domestic case law complicates the possibility of drawing one fixed line of demarcation between 
private and public motives, but rather supports a more intricate interpretation. 
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Comparisons and conclusions from the supplementary means of interpretation  
Two conclusions regarding the interpretation of “for private ends” can be drawn from the 
preparatory works of the LOSC. The first conclusion is the assumption that the drafters 
deliberately chose the motives-approach, as displayed by the Harvard Draft. The next 
assumption is that the term chosen was meant to exclude some motives from constituting piracy, 
namely motives that were purely political falls outside the scope of the criterion. This 
suggestion is expressly supported by the League of Nations and is further implied by the 
Harvard Draft and the ILC.  
 
Unfortunately, there are no clear assumptions to be drawn from state practice, as the different 
states seemed to focus on various elements in their assessment of whether or not an act fulfilled 
the criterion “for private ends”. Some reoccurring elements are nonetheless identified: 
 
Older verdicts, such as The Ambrose Light and Magellan Pirates seemed to focus on the lack 
of authorisation as the only element of importance for the assessment. This view is nonetheless 
in conflict with the ordinary wording of the texts studied and the preparatory works that 
forcefully advocates for a motives-approach as well as some of the other legal sources. 
 
Another reoccurring element found in state practice is the assumption that indiscriminate acts 
of violence not only could, but possibly should, be interpreted into the criterion “for private 
ends”. The first time this element is displayed was in the Bolivia Republic v. Indemnity Mutual 
Marine Assurance Co. Case. Though this verdict was not based on international law of the sea, 
the element of “indiscriminate acts” have gained relevance and support from Churchill. Also, 
the object and purpose of the LOSC and Art. 101, specifically through the principle of freedom 
of navigation as well as the principle of effectiveness, indicates that this element can be of 
relevance. Additionally, the element of indiscriminate acts of violence was not rejected in the 
case of Republic v Dahir and 10 others. 
 
Yet another element identified in state practice is that “personal motives” should be interpreted 
into the criterion. The view that such motives can be interpreted in the definition of piracy was 
first found in the Malek Adhel case and has later been explicitly supported in the cases of Castle 
John and Sea Shepherd. As the ordinary meaning of the English term “for private ends” is 
identified to mean personal purposes in the Spanish text, a view that has been supported also 
by the Arabic and Russian text, the element of “personal motives” have gained support by heavy 
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sources. Furthermore, none of the identified sources have clearly discarded this view. Because 
the ordinary meaning of the texts is quite clear on the matter, and because it has gained further 
support from repeated state practice, it seems sound to conclude that at least purely personal 
motives are to be included in the term “for private ends”. 
 
The last element identified through state practice has to do with the nature of the crime. 
Guilfoyle pointed out that all politically motivated violence against civilians is intolerable. 
Though this view stands in some contrast to the other legal sources identified, an extended 
argument may be recognised: the use of excessive violence might suggest that the act can be 
piratical, also if the motive of the violence was political. This view gains some support from 
the conflicting state practice in the incidents of Achille Lauro and Santa Maria. The reactions 
to the Achille Lauro case, though it was not rightfully viewed as piracy by some states, 
displayed that acts of excessive violence were frown upon and constituted a concern for the 
international community. As the violence conducted was unnecessary, one can argue that the 
hijackers fitted the description given in the Malek Adhel case as one who is emphatically hostis 
humai generis. Because excessive violence threatens the peaceful use of the seas and the 
freedom of navigation, it can be suggested that one should chose the interpretation of the 
criterion “for private ends” that best safeguards these rights, namely by expanding the scope of 




So, what is the correct interpretation of the criterion “for private ends”? Sadly, the interpretation 
of the treaty, through the rules of interpretation set in the VCLT Art. 31, 32 and 33 and the 
sources found in the ICJ Statute, did not provide a clear answer. Thus, the precise content of 
the criterion can only be argued, not identified, through the legal sources existing today. The 
intricacy of the vague wording, multiple and conflicting sources and practices, indicates that 
the answer cannot simply be measured as a concrete line drawn through the spectre of private 
and public ends, settling the definition, as I hoped going into this study. The complexity of the 
issue rather supports a broader approach, where several elements should be considered in each 
individual case to conclude whether or not the act can be regarded as piratical.  
 
Still, one clear conclusion can be drawn: if the motive is clearly and solely “private” or 
“personal”, the motive will meet the criterion “for private ends”. This conclusion is based on 
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the ordinary meaning of the treaty itself and gains heavy support by the preparatory works and 
practice of states. Furthermore, also the context, the object and purpose of the provision and 
most scholarly opinions supports this conclusion.  
 
However, if the purposes of the perpetrators are not clearly private or personal, Tanakas’ 
position of identifying the criterion as an overall assessment, fits best with the explicit and 
implicit intention of all the parties to the LOSC. This assessment consists of several elements. 
Some of the elements are identified in this study, but there are likely several elements of 
relevance than the ones discovered here. 
 
The first and most significant element identified, is the motives “private” or “personal” nature.  
The suggestion is that the more private or personal the motive is, the bigger the incentives are 
for the act to be classified as conducted «for private ends», thus fulfilling the criterion. And 
opposite, if the act seems publicly motivated, other compelling elements of weight are needed 
in order to shift the scale from a non-private or non-personal motive to fulfilling the criterion. 
Not only is this element rooted in the ordinary meaning of the criterion when viewing the 
different texts as one, but this reasoning follows logically from the preparatory works. These 
preparatory works confirm that private ends, such as financial gain is covered, but that at least 
purely political motives are excluded. Furthermore, this view is implicitly supported by all the 
remaining sources, that is the context, object and purpose, preparatory works, state practice and 
scholars. These sources all seem to support the fact that purely private or personal ends are 
included and appear proportionately less clear about the fulfilment of the criterion the closer 
one comes towards purely political motives.  
The second element of interest is the level of indiscriminate and general acts of violence. This 
component could suggest that an act of indiscriminate or general violence could easier be 
identified as a “private end”, than a discriminate attack. Not only would this element safeguard 
the interests of freedom of navigation, but it would also avoid interfering too fiercely with the 
principle of flag state jurisdiction, thus balancing the two opposing intentions of the states.  
Moreover, this view seems to gain support by the fact that the LOSC presumably protects 
warships against liability when encountering acts of indiscriminate violence. As for vessels 
sailing under the threat of discriminate and targeted attacks, the imminent threat of attacks could 
possibly be averted by counter-piracy measures such as those proposed in the Best Management 
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Practice to Deter Piracy vol. 5188 and private security, a cost or inconvenience that ideally would 
not be necessary for vessels subject to lesser threat. Such an element would therefore not lead 
to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, but rather support the interpretation of “for private 
ends”. This element should not to be given determining weight but can provide guidance in the 
case that the other sources are indecisive.  
The last, and possibly least important element identified in this assessment is comingled with 
the violent act itself. Some authors, for example Guilfoyle, seem to indicate that an act of illegal 
violence in itself is enough for an act to be considered piratical. Though this view is not 
supported in this thesis, an extended argument, that excessive use of violence can be a relevant 
element in the assessment, seems to be supported by some of the sources studied. With the use 
of excessive and unnecessary violence, it would be easier to consider a person to fulfil the old 
characterisation of a pirate as hostis humanis generis. The view that a pirate was in fact an 
enemy of mankind was supported in the abovementioned case of Malek Adhel. Furthermore, 
this view attains implicit support by the international reactions to the hijackings of Santa Maria 
and Achille Lauro, though the term hostis humani generis was not used in these incidents. As 
this last element is not derived directly from primary sources of law, but rather interpreted 
through the comparison of different supplementary and subsidiary means of interpretation, the 
weight given to this element ought to be light. 
 
As this conclusion stands in contrast to the private/public standpoint, the latter position should 
arguably be discarded as incorrect. This claim is based on the fact that the ordinary meaning of 
the criterion in all the studied languages, and specifically in the Spanish text, argues with gravity 
that the lack of state authorisation is not sufficient to fulfil the criterion of “for private ends”. 
The motives-approach is also supported by the preparatory works that was used as a basis for 
the final provision.  
 
Furthermore, neither the context or the object and purpose of the treaty gave clear indications 
in any direction. However, it can be assumed that the context did not support the private/public 
standpoint, since most of the arguments drawn from this means of interpretation indicates that 
“private” is not meant as an antonym to public. At the same time fewer and less clear arguments 
 
188 BMP5, Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of 
Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, 2018,Version 5, Authors: BIMCO, ICS, IGP&I Clubs, INTERTANKO 
and OCIMF, Published by Witherby Publishing Group Ltd. 
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do seem to argue in favour of this approach, and the private/public view finds its clearest 
supporters in scholars such as Guilfoyle and the outdated cases of Ambrose light and Magellan 
Pirates. While it is true that some modern state practices do support a wide interpretation of the 
criterion, neither of the most vocal cases, Castle John and Sea Shepherd, found the acts to be 
piratical because the acts lacked state authorisation. Quite the contrary, the acts were 
adjudicated as piratical because the courts found that their motives were in fact personal, thus 
fulfilling the term “for private ends”. The gravity of the legal sources demanding a motive and 
their clearness must be attributed decisive weight in this conflict.  
 
Though this study only identified three elements, it is important to stress that other elements 
than the once revealed here might be relevant. For instance, the components recognized by 
Tanaka, which compliments the identified elements, might be relevant in the assessment.  
 
Unfortunately, this conclusion is not the preferable “clear definition of piracy applicable to all 
States in virtue of international law in general” that the Harvard Draft desired over 80 years 
ago.189 Yet, the mere wish for a clear definition cannot justify a such conclusion to be drawn 
within the time and page limit of this paper, however much it is wanted. 
 
In spite of this anticlimactic conclusion, I still believe that it is possible to reach a more 
comprehensive conclusion with additional time and pages. Such a study would preferably 
include an interpretation of the Chinese text, a fuller representation of the scholarly opinions 
and identify a wider range of state practice, including domestic laws and official statements. 
Such a study might also include concrete examples of situations that would meet the criterion 
“for private ends”. 
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